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Towards Exploring Fundamental Limits of
System-Specific Cryptanalysis Within Limited
Attack Classes: Application to ABSG
Yu¨cel Altug˘, M. Kıvanc¸ Mıhc¸ak Member
Abstract
A new approach on cryptanalysis is proposed where the goal is to explore the fundamental limits of a specific class of attacks
against a particular cryptosystem. As a first step, the approach is applied on ABSG, which is an LFSR-based stream cipher where
irregular decimation techniques are utilized. Consequently, under some mild assumptions, which are common in cryptanalysis, the
tight lower bounds on the algorithmic complexity of successful Query-Based Key-Recovery attacks are derived for two different
setups of practical interest. The proofs rely on the concept of “typicality” of information theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we introduce a (to the best of our knowledge) novel approach to cryptanalysis. In our approach, the focus is
jointly on a particular cryptosystem and a specific (sufficiently broad) class of attacks of interest at the same time. Then, under
some mild conditions, the goal is to derive the achievable fundamental performance limit for the attacks within the considered
class of interest against the cryptosystem at hand. The aforementioned limit should be “achievable”, in the sense that it is
necessary to provide an explicit attack construction of which performance coincides with the derived limit. Furthermore, the
aforementioned limit should also necessarily be “fundamental”, in the sense that within the considered specific class, there
does not exist any attack of which performance is superior to the derived limit.
Our proposed approach contrasts with the trend in conventional cryptanalysis, which can be outlined in two categories. In the
first category, the focus is on the construction of a generic attack, which should be applicable (subject to slight modifications)
to most cryptosystems; common examples include time-memory tradeoff attacks [1], [2], correlation attacks [3], [4], algebraic
attacks [5], [6] and alike. The second category is conceptually on the opposite side of the spectrum. Here, given a particular
cryptosystem, the focus is on the construction of a potentially-specialized attack, which is “tailored” specifically against the
system at hand; hence, the resulting attack is not applicable to a broader class of cryptosystems in general. Although the
approaches pursued in the aforementioned two attack categories are radically different, it is interesting to note that, for both of
them the underlying fundamental goal is the same, which can be summarized as providing a “design advice” to the cryptosystem
designer. In practice, at first, the cryptosystem designer is expected to test his/her proposed system against generic attacks
(first category); thus, such attacks serve as a benchmark for the community of cryptosystem designers. Next, the cryptanalyst
tests a proposed cryptosystem via constructing a cryptosystem-specific attack algorithm (second category). Both categories
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2have been shown to be extremely valuable in practice since the first one provides a “unified approach” to cryptanalysis via
providing some generic attack algorithms and the second one specifically tests the security of the considered cryptosystem and
consequently yields its potential weaknesses. On the other hand, both categories of the conventional approach in cryptanalysis
lack to provide fundamental performance bounds, i.e., the question of “what is the best that can be done?” goes unanswered.
The main reason is that, for the first category, finding out a fundamental performance bound necessarily requires considering
all possible cryptosystems, which is infeasible in practice; within the second category, providing a fundamental performance
bound necessarily requires “describing” all possible cryptanalytic propositions (in a computational sense) and quantifying the
resulting performances, which is again infeasible in practice.
In our proposed approach, we aim to derive “the best possible performance bound” 1 in a reasonably-confined setup.
Intuitively, we “merge” the first and the second categories of the conventional cryptanalytic approach; we jointly focus on
both a particular cryptosystem and a specific class of attacks, and subsequently aim to analytically quantify the fundamental,
achievable performance bounds, i.e., specifically for a given cryptosystem, our goal is to find the achievable lower-bound on
the complexity of a proposed class of attacks, under a set of mild assumptions. The main impact of this approach is that, it
aims to provide an advice for the cryptanalyst, instead of the cryptosystem designer, in contrast with the conventional approach.
If this resulting advice is “positive” (i.e., the fundamental achievable performance bound is of polynomial complexity), then
the weakness of the analyzed cryptosystem is guaranteed (which can also be achieved via pursuing the second category of the
conventional cryptanalytic approach). However, more interestingly, if the resulting advice is “negative” (i.e., the fundamental
achievable performance bound is of exponential complexity), then the considered class of attacks is guaranteed to be useless,
which, in turn, directs a cryptanalyst to consider different classes of attacks, instead of experimenting with various attacks
from the considered class via a (possibly educated) trial-and-error approach. Thus, the negative advice case (for which this
paper serves an exemplary purpose) constitutes the fundamental value of our approach. We believe that our efforts can be
viewed as a contribution towards the goal of enhancing cryptanalytic approaches via incorporating a structural and procedural
methodology.
In order to illustrate our approach, in this paper we consider a class of Query-Based Key-Recovery attacks (of which precise
definition is given in Sec. III-B) targeted towards ABSG [7], which is an LFSR(linear feedback shift register)-based stream
cipher that uses irregular decimation techniques. Recall that, within the class of stream ciphers, the usage of LFSR is an
attractive choice due to the implementation efficiency and favorable statistical properties of the LFSR output; however, security
of LFSR-based stream ciphers is contingent upon applying additional non-linearities per the linear nature of LFSR [8]. An
approach, which aims to achieve this task, is to use irregular decimation techniques to the LFSR output [7], [9], [10], [11].
1Note that, this approach is analogous to providing both achievability and converse proofs in classical information-theory problems. This connection will
further be clarified throughout the paper.
3The motivation lying behind the development of this approach is to render most conventional attacks useless (such as algebraic
attacks). Shrinking [10] and self-shrinking generators (SSG) [11] are two important examples of this approach. In particular, in
the literature SSG is well-known to be a very efficient algorithm and it has been shown to possess favorable security properties
[12], [13], [14]. The bit-search generator (BSG) [9] and its variant ABSG [7] are newer algorithms, which also use irregular
decimation techniques. In [15], it has been shown that the efficiency (output rate) of ABSG is superior to that of SSG and the
security level of ABSG is at least the same level provided by SSG under a broad class of attacks. A detailed analysis of the
statistical properties of ABSG and BSG algorithms has recently been presented in [16]. Since ABSG has been shown to be a
state-of-the-art cryptosystem, in our developments we focus on it under a reasonable class of attacks and subsequently provide
“negative advices” for the cryptanalyst in various setups of interest. Next, we summarize our main results.
Main Results: Our contributions, which have been derived under a set of mild assumptions (specified in Sec. III-A), are as
follows:
• We show that breaking ABSG algorithm is equivalent to “guessing” a sequence of random variables, which are i.i.d.
(independent identically distributed) with geometric distribution of parameter 1/2 using complexity theoretic notions
(Theorem 3.1).
• In order to solve the problem mentioned in the previous item, we formulate a sufficiently broad class of attacks, termed
as “Query-Based Key-Recovery attacks”, which are quite generic by construction, and hence applicable for cryptanalysis
for a wide range of cryptosystems (Definition 3.3).
• Within the class of attacks mentioned in the previous item, first we concentrate on a practically-meaningful subset of them
(termed “Exhaustive-Search Type Query-Based Key-Recovery attacks”) (Sec. IV); we derive a fundamental lower bound
on the complexity of any successful attack in this subset (Theorem 4.2); this lower bound is proven to be achievable to
the first order in the exponent (Theorem 4.1).
• We consider the set of all Query-Based Key-Recovery attacks (Sec. V); we derive a fundamental lower bound on the
complexity of any successful attack within this set (Theorem 5.2), followed by stating the proof of the achievability result
(to the first order in the exponent) using the “most probable choice” attack given in [7] (Theorem 5.1).
Organization of the Paper: In Section II, we present the notation used in the paper and recall the definition of ABSG.
Section III provides the assumptions we have employed throughout the paper, the problem formulation and the definition of
“Query-Based Key-Recovery” (QuBaR) attacks. In Section IV, we derive a tight (to the first order in the exponent) lower bound
on the complexity of exhaustive-search type QuBaR attacks. In Section V, we derive a tight lower bound on the complexity
of any QuBaR attack. We conclude with discussions given in Section VI.
4II. NOTATION AND BACKGROUND
A. Notation
Boldface letters denote vectors; regular letters with subscripts denote individual elements of vectors. Furthermore, capital
letters represent random variables and lowercase letters denote individual realizations of the corresponding random variable.
The sequence of {a1, a2, . . . , aN} is compactly represented by aN1 . Given x ∈ {0, 1}, x¯ denotes the binary complement of x.
The abbreviations “i.i.d.”, “p.m.f.” and “w.l.o.g.” are shorthands for the terms “independent identically distributed”, “probability
mass function” and “without loss of generality”, respectively. Throughout the paper, all logarithms are base-2 unless otherwise
specified. Given a discrete random variable X with the corresponding p.m.f. p (·), defined on the alphabet X , its entropy (in
bits) is H(X) △= −∑x∈X p(x) log p(x). In the sequel, we say that “an and bn are equal to the first order in the exponent”
provided that limn→∞ 1n log
an
bn
= 0, which is denoted by an
.
= bn in our notation.
B. Background
Throughout this paper, we use the notation that was introduced in [16].
Definition 2.1: Given an infinite length binary sequence x = {xn}∞n=1 which is an input to the ABSG algorithm, we define
• y , A (x), where the sequence y represents the internal state of the ABSG algorithm and yi ∈ {∅, 0, 1}, 1 ≤ i < ∞.
The action of algorithm A is defined via the recursive mapping M:
yi =M(yi−1, xi), 1 ≤ i <∞,
with the initial condition y0 = ∅. The mapping M is defined in Table I .
TABLE I
TRANSITION TABLE OF ALGORITHM A
yi−1\xi 0 1
∅ 0 1
0 ∅ 0
1 1 ∅
• z , B (y), where the sequence z represents the output of the ABSG algorithm, such that the action of the algorithm B
is given as follows:
zj =
{
yi−1, if yi = ∅ and yi−2 = ∅,
y¯i−1, if yi = ∅ and yi−2 6= ∅,
where j ≤ i and i, j ∈ Z+.
From Definition 2.1, we clearly deduce that the ABSG algorithm produces an output bit (zj denoting the j-th output bit) if
and only if the value of the corresponding internal state variable (yi denoting the value of the internal state variable at time
i) is ∅. The fact that yi 6= ∅ for all i is the reason of the mismatch between the input sequence indices (which are the same
as the indices of the internal state variables) and the output sequence indices.
5III. PROBLEM SETUP AND FORMULATION
A. Assumptions and Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we consider the type of attacks, in which retrieving L (where L is the degree of the feedback
polynomial of the generating LFSR) linear equations in terms of xM1 is aimed. This type of attacks correspond to key recovery
attacks to ABSG (assuming that the feedback polynomial of LFSR is known to the attacker, which is a common assumption
in cryptanalysis). In particular, within the class of key recovery attacks, we concentrate on query-based key recovery attacks
(abbreviated as “QuBaR attacks” in the rest of the paper); QuBaR attacks shall be defined formally in Sec. III-B. The following
assumptions are made in this attack model:
A1: The length-M input sequence xM1 is assumed to be a realization of an i.i.d. Bernoulli process with parameter 1/2.
A2: The length-N output sequence zN1 is assumed to be given to the attacker, where N,M ∈ Z+ (note that, this implies we
necessarily have M > N ≥ 1 due to Definiton 2.1).
A3: Explicit knowledge of the feedback polynomial of the generating LFSR is not used.
A4: The degree of the feedback polynomial of the generating LFSR, i.e., L, is sufficiently large.
Note that assumption A3 will be further clarified after we describe QuBaR attack model precisely. Further, from now on
we denote the input sequence as XM1 and the corresponding internal state sequence as YM1 due to the stochastic nature of the
input and hence the internal state sequences. Next, we continue with the following definitions.
Definition 3.1: The symbol Hi denotes the index of the i-th ∅ in YM1 , for 0 ≤ i ≤ N .
Note that, since we have Y0 = ∅ with probability 1 by convention, we also use H0 = 0 with probability 1 as the initial
condition for {Hi}.
Definition 3.2: We define Qi △=Hi −Hi−1 − 2, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Remark 3.1: For each Qi (regardless of its particular realization), the ABSG algorithm generates an output bit zi. Thus, the
number of output bits in the ABSG algorithm is precisely equal to the number of corresponding {Qi}.
Next, we state the following result regarding the distribution of {Qi}, which will be heavily used throughout the rest of the
paper.
Lemma 3.1: Under assumptions A1 and A2, the random variables {Qi} are i.i.d. with geometric p.m.f. of parameter 1/2:
p (qi)
△
= Pr
[
Qi = qi|z
N
1
]
= (1/2)
qi+1 , for qi ∈ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (1)
Proof: See Appendix I.
6B. Problem Formulation
In this section, we provide an analytical formulation of the problem considered in this paper. As the first step, we show that,
under assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A4, all key recovery attacks to ABSG are equivalent to recovering the exact realizations
of QN1 , stated in Theorem 3.12:
Theorem 3.1: Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3 and A4, the following three computational problems are equivalent in the
sense of probabilistic polynomial time reducibility [17]:
1) Retrieving any L independent linear equations in terms of XM1 .
2) Retrieving any L consecutive bits from XM1 .
3) Correctly guessing Qθ+i−1i for any positive integers i and θ such that
θ+i−1∑
j=i
(qj + 2) ≥ L, (2)
is satisfied.
Proof: See Appendix II.
Next, we introduce the model for the query type attacks, namely QuBaR attacks, which are considered throughout the paper.
Qualitatively, a QuBaR attack consists of repeating the following procedure: For a cryptosystem that has a secret, generate a
“guess”, which aims to guess the secret itself, and subsequently “checks” whether the guess is equal to the secret or not; if the
guess is equal to the secret, then terminate the procedure, else continue with another guess. The maximum number of guesses
proposed in this procedure are limited by the complexity of the QuBaR attack, which is provided as an input parameter to the
attack algorithm. Note that, if the task at hand is to guess i.i.d. random variables (which is the case for the third problem of
Theorem 3.1), the QuBaR attack model is intuitively obviously reasonable. Furthermore, recall that most of the cryptanalysis
against symmetric key cryptography may be modeled in this way (e.g., time-memory attacks, correlation attacks, algebraic
attacks and alike). Next, we formally present the general form of QuBaR attack algorithms.
Definition 3.3: Assuming the existence of a “check algorithm” T (G) for a “guess” G (the output of T (G) is 1 if and only
if the guess G is equal to the secret), a QuBaR attack algorithm, of complexity C, executes the following steps:
For k = 1 to C
1. Generate a guess Gk.
2. Compute T (Gk).
3. If T (Gk) = 1, then terminate and output the secret given by Gk.
end
Next, we introduce the particular “guess” structure (together with the accompanying relevant definitions) which aims to find
Qθ+i−1i so as to solve the third computational problem of Theorem 3.1.
2For the random variable Qi, its realization is denoted by qi.
7Definition 3.4: An ABSG-guess is a triplet defined as G △= {i, θ,qθ+i−1i }, such that 2θ + β ≥ L, where β
△
=
∑θ−1
j=0 qi+j ,
i ≥ 1 and i+ θ − 1 ≤ N .
The Bernoulli random variable, T (Gk), indicates the success probability of guess Gk and is heavily used throughout the
rest of the paper, where Gk
△
=
(
ik, θk,q
θk+ik−1
ik
)
is the ABSG-guess of a QuBaR attack (against ABSG) at step k. Note
that, at each step k, the “guessed” values qθk+ik−1ik themselves depend on k, which is not explicitly stated (unless otherwise
specified) for the sake of notational convenience; this should be self-understood from the context.
Remark 3.2: Note that, the probability of having a successful QuBaR attack after precisely K steps is equal to Pr [T (G1) = 0,
T (G2) = 0, . . . T (GK−1) = 0, T (GK) = 1] which is not equal to Pr (T (GK) = 1) (the latter being equal to the marginal
successful guess probability at step K). Moreover, neither of these expressions is the success probability of any QuBaR attack
with a specified complexity, which will formally be defined in (4). Observe that our formulation allows the usage of potentially
correlated guesses {Gk} which aims to make the approach as generic as possible.
Corollary 3.1: Per Lemma 3.1 and Definition 3.4, we have
Pr [T (Gk) = 1] = Pr
[
Qik+θk−1ik = q
ik+θk−1
ik
| zN1
]
=
ik+θk−1∏
j=ik
(
1
2
)qj+1
=
(
1
2
)βk+θk
, (3)
where βk
△
=
∑θk−1
j=0 qik+j .
The following corollary, which is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.1, is one of the key results of the paper.
Corollary 3.2: All QuBaR-type attacks against ABSG are probabilistic polynomial time reducible to the QuBaR algorithm
(defined in Definition 3.3) which uses ABSG-guesses defined in Definition 3.4 and aims to find Qθ+i−1i satisfying (2) for any
i, θ ∈ Z+.
Definition 3.5: From now on, we call an arbitrary “ABSG-Guess”, G, simply as “guess”. Further, for the sake of notational
convenience, we use
A = {Gk}
C(A)
k=1
for any attack algorithm A mentioned in Corollary 3.2, where C (A) denotes the (algorithmic) complexity of A (i.e., number
of guesses applied within A). Accordingly, the success probability of any A is given by
Prsucc (A)
△
= Pr
[
∨
C(A)
k=1 T (Gk) = 1
]
= 1− Pr
[
∧
C(A)
k=1 T (Gk) = 0
]
. (4)
Hence, as far as QuBaR attacks against ABSG are concerned, w.l.o.g., in this paper we focus on the ones specified in
Corollary 3.2, which aim to solve the third computational problem of Theorem 3.1. In particular, in the rest of the paper, we
explore the fundamental limits of the aforementioned QuBaR attacks (denoted by A) under various setups of interest.
8Remark 3.3:
(i) Measure of QuBaR Complexity in Terms of L: At first glance, it may look reasonable to evaluate the complexity of a
QuBaR attack in terms of the length of its input, which is N since the input is zN1 . Note that, this is a common practice
in complexity theory. However, when we confine the setup as the application of a QuBaR attack to the ABSG algorithm
(prior to which there exists an LFSR whose length-L initial state is unknown), then it would be more reasonable to
evaluate the complexity of a QuBaR attack in terms of L (since we eventually aim to find L consecutive bits of XM1 ;
see Theorem 3.1). This is precisely the approach we pursue in this paper, i.e., the analysis of the resulting QuBaR attack
complexity is given as a function of L.
(ii) Time Complexity of QuBaR: First, note that the time complexity of a QuBaR attack (denoted by A) is given by the
product of C (A), the complexity of generating a guess and the complexity of checking a guess. Hence, the quantity C (A)
forms a lower bound on the time complexity of the QuBaR attack, A. Furthermore, complexities of both generating a
guess and checking a guess may, in practice, be considered to be of poly (L) (see item (v) of this remark). Moreover, we
will soon show that at optimality C (A) is of exp (L). Hence, at optimality, the lower bound of C (A) is, in practice, tight
to the first order in the exponent. Therefore, throughout this paper, we “treat” the quantity of C (A) as the time complexity
of a QuBaR attack A and carry out the analysis accordingly.
(iii) Data Complexity of QuBaR: First, note that, for a QuBaR attack A, consisting of guesses {Gk}, the data complexity
of the k-th guess Gk =
(
ik, θk,q
θk+ik−1
ik
)
is, by definition, θk. We will soon show that, at “general case” optimality
we have θk = O (L) for each k. Hence, the data complexity of an optimal QuBaR attack A is at most C (A) · O (L).
Furthermore, we will show that at optimality C (A) is of exp (L). Hence, we conclude that, at optimality C (A) is a tight
(to the first order in the exponent) upper bound on the data complexity3.
(iv) Algorithmic Complexity of QuBaR: In parts (ii) and (iii) above, we stress that for an optimal QuBaR attack algorithm
A against ABSG, C (A) forms a tight lower (resp. upper) bound on the time (resp. data) complexity of A, to the first
order in the exponent4. Following the general convention in cryptanalysis, we use the term “algorithmic complexity” as
the maximum of time complexity and data complexity. Thus, we conclude that, at optimality the algorithmic complexity
is equal to the time complexity, Furthermore, at optimality, the time complexity, the data complexity and C (A) are all
equal to each other to the first order in the exponent. Our subsequent developments are based on analytical quantification
of C (A). Moreover, due to the aforementioned reasons, our results on C (A) apply (to the first order in the exponent) to
the time complexity, the data complexity and the algorithmic complexity, as well.
(v) Practical Implementation Approaches to QuBaR Algorithms: As far as practical attacks are concerned, existence of a
3This result is valid for the general case QuBaR attacks, analyzed in Sec. V. For a restricted class of QuBaR attacks, namely “Exhaustive-Search Type”
QuBaR attacks (analyzed in Sec. IV), we show that, at optimality C (A) is a loose upper bound on the data complexity.
4Once again, the argument in this remark is valid for the general case QuBaR attacks of Sec. V.
9polynomial-time guess generation algorithm is obvious. Furthermore, a polynomial-time check algorithm, which corre-
sponds to the procedure of initiating a LFSR (whose feedback polynomial is assumed to be known) with the corresponding
“guessed and retrieved” L consecutive bits of XM1 , generating sufficiently many output bits and comparing them with the
original output bits, constitutes a practical approach.
(vi) Relationship Of QuBaR Attacks With State-Of-The-Art Attack Algorithms: We see that QuBaR attacks are analogous to
“first type of attacks” described in [15], which “aim to exploit possible weaknesses of compression component introduced
by ABSG”. However, note that, QuBaR attacks do not use explicit knowledge of the feedback polynomial of the generating
LFSR, (recall the structure of algorithm T ) which is a direct consequence of the assumption A3.
IV. OPTIMUM EXHAUSTIVE-SEARCH TYPE QUBAR ATTACKS AGAINST ABSG
In this section, we deal with “exhaustive-search” type QuBaR attacks which are formally defined in Definition 4.1. Qual-
itatively, given the output sequence zN1 , an exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack aims to correctly identify θ-many {Qi}
(equivalently at least L consecutive bits of XM1 per Theorem 3.1) beginning from an arbitrarily-chosen, fixed index, subject
to constraint (2) 5. Since the attacker is confined to initiate the guesses beginning from a fixed index for exhaustive-search
attacks, in practice this can be thought to be equivalent to a scenario where the attacker uses only a single portion of the
observed output sequence zN1 .
First theorem of this section, namely Theorem 4.1, proves the existence of an exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack with
success probability of 1 − ǫ (for any ǫ > 0) with algorithmic complexity 22L/3 (in particular, with time complexity 22L/3
and data complexity L/3) under the assumptions mentioned in Section III-A. The second theorem of this section, namely
Theorem 4.2, proves that the algorithmic complexity of the best (in the sense of C) exhaustive-search type QuBaR algorithm
under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4 is lower-bounded by 22L/3 (to the first order in the exponent). Hence, as a result
of these two theorems, we show that the overall algorithmic complexity of the best exhaustive-search attack against ABSG
has complexity 22L/3 to the first order in the exponent (argued in Corollary 4.1). Note that, in [15] Gouget et. al. mention
the existence of an exhaustive-search attack (under i.i.d. Bernoulli 1/2 input assumption) of complexity O (22L/3) without
providing the details of the attack. Our main novelty in this section is that, we provide a rigorous proof about the existence
of such an attack (Theorem 4.1, which is analogous to the “achievability”-type proofs in traditional lossless source coding)
and further show that this is the best (to the first order in the exponent) in the sense of algorithmic complexity under some
certain assumptions, specifically within the class of exhaustive-search QuBaR attacks (Theorem 4.2, which is analogous to the
“converse”-type proofs in traditional lossless source coding). As a result, the developments in this section can be considered to
be analogous to those of source coding by Shannon [18]; see Remark 4.3 for a further discussion on this subject. Theorem 4.3
5In contrast with exhaustive-search attacks, we also consider a generalized version, where we focus on identifying θ-many {Qi}, possibly beginning from
arbitrarily-chosen, multiple indices, which constitutes the topic of Sec. V.
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concludes the section, which characterizes some necessary conditions of the optimal exhaustive-search type QuBaR attacks
against ABSG.
We begin our developments with the formal definition of exhaustive-search type QuBaR attacks.
Definition 4.1: The class of exhaustive-search type QuBaR attacks against ABSG are defined as
SE
△
= {AE = {Gk}
C(AE)
k=1 : ∀k, ik = 1}, (5)
where each k-th guess Gk =
(
ik, θk,q
θk+ik−1
ik
)
is subject to (2) (see Definition 3.4).
Remark 4.1: Exhaustive-search type attacks constitute an important class of attacks in cryptanalysis. They essentially
determine the “effective size” of the key space of any cipher. In case of ABSG, as we mentioned at the beginning of this
section, since the exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack uses a single portion of the output sequence, they form a basic choice
for practical cryptanalysis via QuBaR attacks in situations where a limited amount (poly (L)) of output data are available to
the attacker.
Thus, at each k-th step, via guess Gk an exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack aims to correctly identify θk-many {Qi}
subject to (2) beginning from a fixed index ik, equivalently at least L consecutive bits of XM1 beginning from the index i′k
(in general i′k 6= ik due to the “decimation” nature of ABSG). As we specified in Definition 4.1, in our developments w.l.o.g.
we use ik = 1 (which in turn implies having i′k = 1 as well).
Theorem 4.1: (Achievability - Exhaustive-Search) Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, mentioned in Section III-A,
there exists an exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack algorithm AEach,opt against ABSG with C
(
AEach,opt
)
= 22L/3 such that
Prsucc
(
AEach,opt
)
> 1 − ǫ, for any ǫ > 0. Further, Cave
(
AEach,opt
)
= 12
(
22L/3 + 1
)
where Cave
(
AEach,opt
)
is the expected
complexity of AEach,opt over the probability distribution induced by q.
Proof: See Appendix III.
Remark 4.2: An inspection of the proof of Theorem 4.1 reveals that (as promised in Remark 3.3) the overall data complexity
of the proposed attack algorithm AEach,opt is L/3 which certainly implies that each guess is of data complexity O (L).
Furthermore, the overall time complexity of AEach,opt is O
(
22L/3
)
assuming that the contribution of the generation of each
guess is poly (L) (which is reasonable in practice). Note that, the time and data complexity of the proposed attack AEach,opt
used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 coincides with the one mentioned in [15].
Next, we prove the converse counterpart of Theorem 4.1, namely derive a lower bound on the algorithmic complexity of
any exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack with an inequality constraint on the success probability.
Theorem 4.2: (Converse - Exhaustive-Search) Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, and for any AE ∈ SE with
Prsucc
(
AE
)
> 12 , we necessarily have C
(
AE
)
> CEmin
△
= 22L/3
(
1
2 −
6
L
)
.
Proof: See Appendix IV.
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Corollary 4.1: After some straightforward algebra, it can be shown that
C
(
A
E
ach,opt
) .
= Cave
(
A
E
ach,opt
) .
= CEmin
in L. Thus, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 show that, under the assumptions mentioned in Section III-A, the tight lower bound (to the
first order in the exponent) on the algorithmic complexity of any exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack against ABSG is 22L/3.
Following remark provides the promised discussion at the beginning of the section, which interprets the relationship between
the result proved in this section (namely, Theorems 4.1 and 4.2) and the traditional lossless source coding of information theory.
Remark 4.3: Observe that for the exhaustive-search setup, the problem is “somewhat dual” of the lossless source coding
problem. Intuitively, the concept of cryptographic compression (which is also termed as “decimation” in this paper) aims to
produce a sequence of random variables, such that the sequence is as long as possible with the highest entropy possible so as to
render cryptographic attacks useless as much as possible (which amounts to making the decimation operation “non-invertible”
in practice). On the other hand, in lossless source coding, the goal is to produce an output sequence which is as short as
possible while maintaining “exact invertibility” (which amounts to “lossless” decoding). Hence, it is not surprising that, from
the cryptanalyst’s point of view, usage of concepts from lossless source coding may be valuable. To be more precise, the
cryptanalyst aims to identify a set of highly-probable sequences (each of which is a collection of i.i.d. random variables from
a known distribution), of which cardinality is as small as possible, thereby maximizing the chances of a successful guess with
the least number of trials. As a result, the usage of the concept of typicality fits naturally within this framework. In particular,
typicality is the essence of the proof of the converse theorem (Theorem 4.2), which states a fundamental lower bound on the
complexity of all possible exhaustive-search type QuBaR attacks. The outcome of “converse” states a negative result (which
is unknown for the case of stream ciphers to the best of our knowledge) within a reasonable attack class in cryptanalysis by
construction. This observation contributes to a significant portion of our long-term goal, which includes construction of a unified
approach to cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. In particular, our future research includes focusing on specific cryptosystems and
quantifying fundamental bounds on the performance of attacks (within a pre-specified reasonable class) against these systems.
Following theorem characterizes some important necessary conditions for an optimal exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack
against ABSG, subject to an equality constraint on the success probability. Thus, these results are important in practice since
they provide some guidelines in construction of optimal or near-optimal exhaustive-search type QuBaR attacks.
Theorem 4.3: Given an optimal (in the sense of minimizing C (AEopt) subject to an equality constraint on the success
probability) exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack (denoted by AEopt) against ABSG, we have the following necessary conditions:
(i) The corresponding guesses are prefix-free.
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(ii) The corresponding “success events” {T (Gi) = 1}C(A
E
opt)
i=1 are disjoint.
(iii) We have
Prsucc
(
A
E
opt
)
= Pr
(
∨
C(AEopt)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
=
C(AEopt)∑
k=1
Pr (T (Gk) = 1) . (6)
(iv) The corresponding “success events” {T (Gi) = 1}C(A
E
opt)
i=1 satisfy
(i > j) =⇒ [Pr (T (Gi) = 1) ≤ Pr (T (Gj) = 1)] ,
for any i 6= j, such that, i, j ∈
{
1, . . . , C
(
AEopt
)}
.
Proof: See Appendix V.
V. OPTIMUM QUBAR ATTACKS AGAINST ABSG (GENERAL CASE)
In this section, we consider the “general case QuBaR attacks”, i.e., we relax the condition of being “exhaustive-search”,
which amounts to relaxing the condition of ik = 1 for {Gk} in (5). Thus, the goal of the attacker is to guess the true values
of Qi−θ+1i , subject to (2), for an arbitrary initial index i, equivalently (cf. Theorem 3.1) the attacker’s goal is to retrieve any
(at least) L consecutive bits from the input sequence XM1 . Note that, this setup implies that exponential amount of output
bits are available to the attacker for the cryptanalysis. As we will show in the sequel, via following this formulation, we
can improve the time-complexity (and hence the overall algorithmic complexity) at the expense of an exponential increase
in the data complexity (which does not affect the overall algorithmic complexity). Thus, the general case can be viewed as
one extreme regarding the time-data tradeoff; the other extreme is the exhaustive-search type attacks covered in the previous
section.
Similar to the exhaustive-search case, we prove an achievability result first, namely Theorem 5.1, (which is simply the
“most-probable choice attack” of [7], [15]), which implies the existence of a QuBaR attack of algorithmic complexity 2L/2
under the assumptions mentioned in Section III-A. Next, we provide the converse theorem for the general case, which states
that the best QuBaR attack’s algorithmic complexity is lower bounded with 2L/2−1 under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4.
Hence, we conclude that, to the first order in the exponent, the best QuBaR attack against ABSG is of complexity 2L/2.
We begin our development with the following definition.
Definition 5.1: The set of “successful” QuBaR attacks is defined as
Sp
△
=
{
A = {Gk}
C(A)
k=1 : Pr
(
∨
C(A)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
> 1/2
}
. (7)
We treat any A ∈ Sp as a successful QuBaR attack and derive an achievable (to the first order in the exponent) lower bound
on the complexity of these attacks.
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First, for the sake of completeness, we state the achievability result via providing an extended version of the proof regarding
the complexity of the proposed “most probable choice attack” of [7], [15] using our notation.
Theorem 5.1: [7], [15] (Achievability - General Case) Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, mentioned in Section III-A,
there exists a QuBaR attack algorithm Aach,opt ∈ Sp against ABSG with C (Aach,opt) = 2L/2. Further, Cave (Aach,opt) =
1
2
(
2L/2 + 1
)
where Cave (Aach,opt) is the expected complexity of Aach,opt over the probability distribution induced by q.
Proof: See Appendix VI.
Remark 5.1: For the proposed attack Aach,opt, assuming that the generation of all of the guesses G (·) and the corresponding
check algorithm T (G (·)) are poly (L), both the time and data complexity of the attack can be shown to be equal to 2L/2 to
the first order in the exponent.
Next, we state the converse theorem, which can be viewed as a fundamental result due to its negative nature as far as
cryptanalysis concerned, to the best of our knowledge.
Theorem 5.2: (Converse - General Case) Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, and for any A ∈ Sp, we necessarily have
C (A) > Cmin
△
= 2L/2−1.
Proof: See Appendix VII.
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 imply the following result:
Corollary 5.1: Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4, the tight (to the first order in the exponent) lower bound on
algorithmic complexity of any QuBaR attack against ABSG is 2L/2:
C (Aach,opt)
.
= Cave (Aach,opt)
.
= Cmin.
Remark 5.2: A practically useful consequence of Corollary 5.1 is as follows: In order to develop a successful “query-
based-recovery” (QuBaR) attack (in the sense of being an element of Sp) of complexity less than O
(
2L/2
) (say poly (L)),
it is necessary to consider a construction where at least one of the assumptions A1, A2, A3, A4 is relaxed. Recalling these
assumptions, it is advisable to concentrate on a setup where the assumptions A1 and/or A3 do not apply; in practice, this
may lead to using a deterministic approach [16], where explicit knowledge of the generating LFSR’s feedback polynomial is
utilized and the input sequence to ABSG, x, is an M -sequence6.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to cryptanalysis. We aim to explore fundamental performance limits within
a specified class of attacks of interest, targeted towards breaking a particular cryptosystem. As a first step, we illustrate our
6For further details on M -sequences, we refer the interested reader to [8].
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approach via considering the class of “Query-Based Key-Recovery” (QuBaR) attacks against ABSG, which is an LFSR-
based stream cipher constructed via irregular decimation techniques. In order to achieve this task, we rely on the following
assumptions (which are quite common in conventional cryptanalysis): The input sequence to ABSG is assumed to be an
independent identically distributed Bernoulli process with probability 1/2; the attacker has access to the output sequence of
ABSG; an explicit knowledge of the generating LFSR’s feedback polynomial is not used; and the degree of the feedback
polynomial (denoted by L) of the generating LFSR is sufficiently large. Using these assumptions, we show that breaking
ABSG is equivalent to determine the exact realizations of a sequence of random variables, which are proven to be independent
identically distributed with geometric distribution of parameter 1/2. Next, we investigate two setups of interest. In the first
setup, we concentrate on the “Exhaustive-Search Type QuBaR” attacks (which form a subset of general-case QuBaR attacks,
such that the starting index of all guesses in any element of this set is constrained to be equal to unity). Here, using notions
from information theory (in particular asymptotic equipartition property [18]), we prove that the tight lower bound (to the first
order in the exponent) on the algorithmic complexity of any successful Exhaustive-Search Type QuBaR attack is 22L/3. In the
second setup, we concentrate on the general case QuBaR attacks and follow an analogous development to that of the former
setup. In particular, we prove that the tight lower bound (to the first order in the exponent) on the algorithmic complexity
of any successful QuBaR attack is 2L/2. Our results can be viewed as a “negative advice” to the cryptanalyst (contrary to
the conventional trend in cryptanalysis, where the general goal is to deduce a “negative design advice” to the cryptosystem
designer) in terms of QuBaR attacks against ABSG under the aforementioned assumptions.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1
First, note that each output bit Zi = zi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ) is produced by a block of input bits from the input sequence XM1 .
In order to identify the i-th input block that generates Zi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ), we define
Ai
△
= 1 +
i−1∑
j=1
[Qj + 2] = Hi−1 −H0 + 1 = Hi−1 + 1,
Bi
△
=
i∑
j=1
[Qj + 2] = Hi −H0 = Hi,
where we used H0 = 0 as the initial condition. Hence, we note that the input block XBiAi produces the i-th output bit Zi = zi
which is given per assumption A2. Further, from the definition of the algorithm B (see Definition 2.1), we have
Pr (XAi+1 = zi |Zi = zi) = 1. (I-1)
Next, note that the statement of the lemma is equivalent to
Pr
(
QN1 = q
N
1 |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
=
N∏
i=1
[
Pr
(
Qi = qi |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)]
=
N∏
i=1
(
1
2
)qi+1
. (I-2)
Thus, it is necessary and sufficient to show (I-2) to prove Lemma 3.1. In order to show (I-2), we use proof by induction.
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• Step 1: We would like to show
Pr
(
Q1 = q1 |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
=
(
1
2
)q1+1
. (I-3)
Since the value of Q1 depends only on the first output bit, we have
Pr
(
Q1 = q1 |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
= Pr (Q1 = q1 |Z1 = z1) .
Next,
Pr (Q1 = 0 |Z1 = z1) = Pr (X1 = z1, X2 = z1 |Z1 = z1) , (I-4)
= Pr (X1 = z1 |Z1 = z1) , (I-5)
=
1
2
, (I-6)
where (I-4) follows from the definition of the mapping M(·, ·) (Table I), (I-5) follows from (I-1), (I-6) follows from
assumption A1. Also, for q1 > 0,
Pr (Q1 = q1 |Z1 = z1) = Pr (X1 = z¯1, X2 = z1, . . . , Xq1+1 = z1, Xq1+2 = z¯1 |Z1 = z1) , (I-7)
= Pr (X1 = z¯1, X3 = z1, . . . , Xq1+1 = z1, Xq1+2 = z¯1 |Z1 = z1) , (I-8)
=
(
1
2
)q1+1
(I-9)
where (I-7) follows from the definition of the mapping M (·, ·) (Table I), (I-8) follows from (I-1), (I-9) follows from
assumption A1. Combining (I-6) and (I-9), we get (I-3).
• Step 2: We assume that
Pr
(
Qn−11 = q
n−1
1 |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
=
n−1∏
i=1
[
Pr
(
Qi = qi |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)]
=
n−1∏
i=1
(
1
2
)qi+1
. (I-10)
• Step 3: Given (I-10) we want to show that
Pr
(
Qn1 = q
n
1 |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
=
n∏
i=1
[
Pr
(
Qi = qi |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)]
=
n∏
i=1
(
1
2
)qi+1
. (I-11)
Note that, given (I-10), (I-11) is equivalent to
Pr
(
Qn = qn |Q
n−1
1 = q
n−1
1 ,Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
= Pr
(
Qn = qn |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
=
(
1
2
)qn+1
, (I-12)
using Bayes rule. Now,
Pr
(
Qn = 0 |Q
n−1
1 = q
n−1
1 ,Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
= Pr
(
XAn = zn, XAn+1 = XBn = zn |Q
n−1
1 = q
n−1
1 ,Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
,(I-13)
= Pr
(
XAn = zn |Q
n−1
1 = q
n−1
1 ,Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
, (I-14)
= Pr
(
XAn = zn |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
= Pr
(
Qn = 0 |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
, (I-15)
= Pr (XAn = zn |Zn = zn) =
1
2
(I-16)
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where (I-13) follows from the definition of the mapping M(·, ·) (Table I), (I-14) follows from (I-1), (I-15) and (I-16)
follow from assumption A1 7. On the other hand, for qn > 0, we have
Pr
(
Qn = qn |Q
n−1
1 = q
n−1
1 ,Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
= Pr
(
XAn = z¯n, XAn+1 = zn, . . . XBn−1 = zn, XBn = z¯n |Q
n−1
1 = q
n−1
1 ,Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
, (I-17)
= Pr
(
XAn = z¯n, XAn+2 = zn, . . . XBn−1 = zn, XBn = z¯n |Q
n−1
1 = q
n−1
1 ,Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
, (I-18)
= Pr
(
XAn = z¯n, XAn+2 = zn, . . . XBn−1 = zn, XBn = z¯n |Z
N
1 = z
N
1
)
, (I-19)
= Pr (XAn = z¯n, XAn+2 = zn, . . . XBn−1 = zn, XBn = z¯n |Zn = zn) =
(
1
2
)qn+1
, (I-20)
where (I-17) follows from the definition of the mapping M(·, ·) (Table I), (I-18) follows from (I-1), (I-19) and (I-20)
follow from assumption A1 (see the discussion in the footnote). Combining (I-15), (I-16), (I-19), (I-20), we get (I-12),
and equivalently (I-11), which completes the proof.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
The equivalence of the first and second problems is shown in [15]. In order to prove the theorem, we proceed with proving
the equivalence of the second and third problems.
First, we show that the third problem reduces to the second problem in poly (L) time: Since we know zN1 and Qθ+i−1i per
assumption, we construct L consecutive bits of XM1 via using Definition 2.1 in the following way. We are given Qi+θ−1i =
qi+θ−1i such that (2) holds. Then, we apply the following algorithm:
1) For each j = i, i+ 1, . . . , θ + i− 1 do:
a) If qj = 0, generate Bj = {zj , zj}.
b) If qj > 0, generate Bj =
{
z¯j , z
qj
j , z¯j
}
2) Concatenate {Bj}θ+i−1j=i thereby forming the desired X = x sequence.
Note that, the condition (2) ensures that the resulting X = x sequence {Bi, Bi+1, . . . , Bθ+i−1} is of length at least L.
Furthermore, from the definition of the ABSG algorithm, the resulting X = x sequence is unique and necessarily the correct
one. Obviously, this algorithm runs in poly (L) time, which completes the proof for this case.
Next, we proceed with showing that the second problem can be reduced to the third problem via an algorithm in probabilistic
polynomial time. First, note the following Lemma.
7Since X is an i.i.d. Bernoulli 1/2 process, the value of Pr (XAn = zn |Zn = zn) is independent of the particular value of An and that is why it is
equal to 1/2.
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Lemma II-1: Under the assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A4, for any n ∈ Z+, we have
Pr
[
∧
poly(L)
l=0 Yn+l 6= ∅
]
≤ ǫ, (II-1)
for any ǫ > 0 for L sufficiently large.
Proof: First, under the given assumptions, we note the following fundamental results from [16]:
• For any n ∈ Z+,
Pr (Yn = ∅) =
1
3
+
2
3
(
−
1
2
)n
. (II-2)
• {Yn} form a Markovian process with memory-1:
Pr
(
Yn|Y
n−1
1 = y
n−1
1
)
= Pr (Yn|Yn−1 = yn−1) , (II-3)
for any n ∈ Z+.
• For any n ∈ Z+,
Pr (Yn 6= ∅|Yn−1 6= ∅) =
1
2
. (II-4)
Hence, for any ǫ > 0 we have
Pr
[
∧
poly(L)
l=0 Yn+l 6= ∅
]
= Pr (Yn 6= ∅) ·
poly(L)∏
l=1
Pr
(
Yn+l 6= ∅| ∧
l−1
k=0 Yn+k 6= ∅
)
, (II-5)
= Pr (Yn 6= ∅) ·
poly(L)∏
l=1
Pr (Yn+l 6= ∅|Yn+l−1 6= ∅) , (II-6)
=
[
2
3
−
2
3
(
−
1
2
)n]
·
(
1
2
)poly(L)−1
, (II-7)
≤ ǫ (II-8)
where (II-5) follows from Bayes rule, (II-6) follows from (II-3), (II-7) follows from (II-2) and (II-4), (II-8) follows from the
fact that the first term in (II-7) is constant in L and the second term is exponentially decaying in L whence ǫ can be made
arbitrarily small for sufficiently large L.
Now, since Yn ∈ {0, 1,∅} (i.e., there are constant possibilities for Yn), w.l.o.g. we assume that Yn is known. Since we
are also given Xn+Ln+1 for some n ∈ Z+, this also means we know Yn+Ln (via successively applying M (Yn+l−1, Xn+l) for
l = 1, 2, . . . , L). Next, consider the following situations:
1) Yn = Yn+L = ∅:
In this case, w.l.o.g. we choose hi−1 = n for some i. Next, let K denote the number of ∅’s within the sequence Yn+Ln
(which is necessarily ≥ 2 per assumption) and assign θ = K − 1. Next, let hi+j−2 denote the index of the j-th ∅
within the sequence Yn+Ln , where 1 ≤ j ≤ K = θ + 1 (implying hi+K−2 = hi+θ−1 = n + L). Accordingly, assign
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qj = hj − hj−1 − 2 for all j ∈ {i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ θ − 1}. Note that, all these {hj} (equivalently {qj}) are known since
Yn+Ln is known. Consequently, this means we have identified Qi+θ−1i = q
i+θ−1
i such that
θ+i−1∑
j=i
(qj + 2) =
θ+i−1∑
j=i
(hj − hj−1) = hθ+i−1 − hi = L,
satisfying the constraint (2). Further, note that the operations performed within this procedure constitute an algorithm,
which is in deterministic polynomial time (implying it is also in probabilistic polynomial time).
2) Yn = ∅ and Yn+L 6= ∅:
In this case, since Yn+L 6= ∅, we aim to identify some Yn+L+L′ = ∅ for L′ > 0 with high probability in polynomial
time. To achieve this task, we consider the sequence {Yn+L+k} for k > 0. Now, note that as we increment k, after
poly (L) steps we necessarily need to come across a ∅ with high probability (the probability of not coming across a
∅ is exponentially small in L per Lemma II-1). Thus, we have Yn = Yn+L′′ = ∅ where L′′ = L + L′ > L. Next,
applying algorithmic steps analogous to the ones in Situation 1 (i.e., beginning from Yn = Yn+L′′ = ∅), we identify
Qi+θ−1i = q
i+θ−1
i such that
θ+i−1∑
j=i
(qj + 2) =
θ+i−1∑
j=i
(hj − hj−1) = hθ+i−1 − hi = L
′′ > L,
satisfying the constraint (2). Further, note that the operations performed within this procedure constitute an algorithm,
which is in probabilistic polynomial time.
3) Yn 6= ∅ and Yn+L = ∅:
Our overall goal is to identify (via using an algorithm, which is in probabilistic polynomial time) Yn+L = Yn+L′′′ = ∅
such that L′′′ − L > L. In that case, we would be able to apply algorithmic steps analogous to the ones in Situation 1
(i.e., beginning from Yn+L = Yn+L′′′ = ∅) and identify Qi+θ−1i = qi+θ−1i such that
θ+i−1∑
j=i
(qj + 2) =
θ+i−1∑
j=i
(hj − hj−1) = hθ+i−1 − hi = L
′′′ − L > L,
satisfying the constraint (2). Next, we show that, beginning from Yn+L, we are able to find some Yn+L′′′ = ∅ such that
L′′′ > 2L via a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. To see this, first consider the sequence {Yn+L+k} for k > 0 (as
we did in Situation 2). Following Lemma II-1 and using similar arguments to Situation 2, we see that as we increment
k by poly (L), we necessarily come across a ∅ with high probability. Next, we apply this step L/2 times; at each step,
we increment k by poly (L) and at each step, we see a ∅ with probability 1− ǫ where ǫ is exponentially small in L per
Lemma II-1. Thus, as a result of incrementing k by a total of L2 · poly (L) (which is again poly (L)), we observe L/2
∅’s with sufficiently high probability, which makes this procedure an algorithm in probabilistic polynomial time. On the
other hand, observing L/2 ∅’s guarantee us to identify some L′′′ such that L′′′ > 2L since the gap between two ∅’s is
at least 2 due to the definition of the ABSG algorithm. As a result, we see that we can identify Yn+L′′′ = ∅ such that
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L′′′ − L > L via an algorithm which is in probabilistic polynomial time, which was our initial goal.
4) Yn 6= ∅ and Yn+L 6= ∅:
This is straightforward via applying an approach analogous to the Situation 3 above. Again, we begin from Yn+L, consider
the sequence Yn+L+k for k > 0, increment k in blocks of length poly (L); the only difference is that this time we use
L
2 +1 blocks (each of which is poly (L)) instead of L2 . As a result, we are guaranteed to identify Yn+L′′′′ = Yn+L′′′′′ = ∅
such that L′′′′′ − L′′′′ > L via an algorithm which is in probabilistic polynomial time; the rest is obvious.
Thus, the proof of the (probabilistic polynomial time) reduction of the second problem to the third one is completed. Hence
the proof of Theorem 3.1.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
For the sake of clarity, throughout this section we use the notation Gk
(
ik, θk,
(
q
θk+ik−1
ik
)
k
)
(instead of Gk
(
ik, θk,q
θk+ik−1
ik
)
)
to denote a particular guess Gk.
Choosing n △= L/3, first we define the typical set A(n)ǫ with respect to p (q) (given by (1)):
A(n)ǫ
△
=
{
qn1 :
∣∣∣∣− 1n log p (qn1 )−H (Q)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
}
, (III-1)
where (using logarithm with base-2)
H (Q) = −
∞∑
q=0
p (q) log p (q) = 2.
At this point, we also recall two fundamental results regarding typical sets [19]:
(1− ǫ) 2n(H(Q)−ǫ) ≤
∣∣∣A(n)ǫ ∣∣∣ ≤ 2n(H(Q)+ǫ) (III-2)
Pr
(
qn1 ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
)
> 1− ǫ (III-3)
for any ǫ > 0, for sufficiently large n.
Next, we propose the following construction for the attack AEach,opt:
1. Index all qn1 ∈ A
(n)
ǫ and accordingly let (qn1 )k denote the k-th element where k ∈
{
1, 2, . . . ,
∣∣∣A(n)ǫ ∣∣∣}. Let qi,k denote the
i-th element of (qn1 )k for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
2. At each k-th step of the QuBaR attack, choose Gk =
(
ik = 1, θk = n =
L
3 , (q
n
1 )k
)
; k ∈
{
1, 2, . . . ,
∣∣∣A(n)ǫ ∣∣∣}.
Note that, this attack qualifies as a “QuBaR attack against ABSG” only if all of the aforementioned guesses satisfy the
constraint (2). To see that this is satisfied for arbitrarily small ǫ, we observe (noting that βk =
∑n
i=1 qi,k)∣∣∣∣− 1n log p ((qn1 )k)−H (Q)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
(
1 +
βk
θk
)
− 2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ (III-4)
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where the equality follows from (1), the definition of βk and using θk = n, the inequality follows from (III-1). Furthermore,
using θk = n = L/3, after straightforward algebra (III-4) can be shown to be equivalent to
L
(
1−
ǫ
3
)
≤ 2θk + βk ≤ L
(
1 +
ǫ
3
)
.
Since we can choose ǫ arbitrarily small, the aforementioned attack qualifies as a QuBaR attack against ABSG as ǫ→ 0.
Next, (III-3) implies that for large n (equivalently for large L) Prsucc
(
AEach,opt
)
= Pr
(
qn1 ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
)
can be made arbitrarily
close to 1 since we can choose ǫ arbitrarily small. Thus, Prsucc
(
AEach,opt
)
→ 1 as L→∞ and ǫ→ 0. Furthermore, for large L
the algorithmic complexity is at most
∣∣∣A(n)ǫ ∣∣∣ which can be made arbitrarily close to 22L/3 per (III-2) since n = L/3, H (Q) = 2
and we can choose ǫ arbitrarily small. Thus, the algorithmic complexity is at most 22L/3 as L → ∞, ǫ → 0. Recalling that
for sufficiently small ǫ, all elements of A(n)ǫ are equiprobable (since βk ∈ N, θk ∈ Z+) with probability 2−(θk+βk)
∣∣
θk=βk=L/3
,
we immediately see that the expected algorithmic complexity is 12
(
22L/3 + 1
)
. Note that in the proposed attack, ik = 1 and
θk = n = L/3 for all k which implies that the corresponding data complexity is L/3.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2
First of all, since L is sufficiently large (per assumption A4), we assume w.l.o.g. L is divisible by 6. Our fundamental goal
is to characterize the algorithmic complexity of the optimal attacks subject to a lower bound on the success probability of the
attack. Thus, we aim to analytically identify
A
E
opt
△
= arg min
AE∈SEp
C
(
A
E
)
, (IV-1)
where
SEp
△
=
{
A
E : AE ∈ SE and Pr
(
∨
C(AE)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
>
1
2
}
⊆ SE ,
i.e., SEp is a “probabilistically-constrained” subset of SE for which the success probability is strictly bounded away from 1/2.
In our terminology, we denote the quantity of Pr
(
∨
C(A)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
as the success probability of algorithm A. Our problem
is to characterize
CEmin
△
= C
(
A
E
opt
)
,
in particular, we aim to achieve this goal via quantifying a lower bound on it.
Our proof approach can be summarized as follows: Since it is not a straightforward task to solve the optimization problem
(IV-1), we proceed with a simpler problem. We define a set S˜Ep , such that SEp ⊆ S˜Ep ⊆ SE , and accordingly proceed with
minimizing C
(
AE
)
over all AE ∈ S˜Ep . The set S˜Ep is defined in such a way that minimizing C
(
AE
)
over this set (i.e., over
all AE ∈ S˜Ep ) is tractable. At the last step, we conclude the proof via deriving a lower bound on the minimum algorithmic
complexity over S˜Ep , which also forms a lower bound on CEmin since SEp ⊆ S˜Ep .
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We proceed with defining the set
S˜Ep
△
=

AE : AE ∈ SE and
C(AE)∑
k=1
Pr (T (Gk) = 1) >
1
2


In our terminology, we denote the quantity of
∑C(A)
k=1 Pr (T (Gk) = 1) as the cumulative success probability of algorithm A.
Note that, success probability is always upper-bounded by cumulative success probability for any algorithm A; i.e., we have
Pr
(
∨
C(A)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
≤
C(A)∑
k=1
Pr (T (Gk) = 1)
due to the union bound, which implies SEp ⊆ S˜Ep ⊆ SE . Next, we define the optimization problem (which is “alternate” to
(IV-1))
A˜
E
opt
△
= arg min
AE∈S˜Ep
C
(
A
E
)
, (IV-2)
and accordingly
C˜Emin
△
= C
(
A˜
E
opt
)
.
In order to quantify the solution of (IV-2), for the sake of convenience we define
G (θ, α)
△
=
{
qθ1 : ∀i, qi ≥ 0, θ ∈ Z
+, α ∈ N,
θ∑
i=1
qi = β = L− 2θ + α
}
(IV-3)
for any given θ ∈ Z+ and α ∈ N. Observe that {G (θ, α)} are clearly disjoint for different pairs of {(θ, α)}. Further, note that,
by construction, qθ1 ∈ G (θ, α) for some θ ∈ Z+, α ∈ N implies (2) since 2θ+β = L+α ≥ L; thus, any guess G =
(
1, θ,qθ1
)
where qθ1 ∈ G (θ, α) for some θ ∈ Z+, α ∈ N is a valid ABSG-guess. Furthermore, any valid guess G necessarily corresponds
to a qθ1 ∈ G (θ, α) for some unique pair (θ, α). Next, using (3) observe that
p
(
qθ1
)
= 2−(θ+β)
∣∣∣
β=L−2θ+α
= 2−(L−θ+α), (IV-4)
for any qθ1 ∈ G (θ, α); i.e., given a pair (θ, α), all elements of G (θ, α) are equally likely with probability 2−(L−θ+α).
Going back to (IV-2), since we are trying to achieve a cumulative success probability strictly greater than 1/2 using elements
from disjoint sets {G (θ, α)}, the optimal strategy is clearly to use the sorted elements qθ1 ∈ G (θ, α) with respect to their
success probabilities, specified in (IV-4) 8. Thus, algorithmically the optimal solution consists of trying the guess with largest
marginal success probability first, and then the most probable guess in the remaining ones, and so on.
Next, we aim to characterize the aforementioned sorting process and analyze the minimum number of elements needed to
achieve a cumulative success probability strictly greater than 1/2. Since all elements of G (θ, α) are equally likely (cf. (IV-4)),
the problem of sorting individual sequences reduces to the problem of sorting the sets {G (θ, α)} in non-increasing order with
8This problem is trivially equivalent to the problem of obtaining a pre-specified amount of cake with minimum number of slices, where the slice sizes are
fixed, but not necessarily uniform.
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respect to (IV-4). The total number of elements in these sorted sets of {G (θ, α)} such that the total probability exceeds 1/2
amounts to the sought result C˜Emin. As a result, we should solve the following sorting problem:
Sorting Problem I: Sort over (θ, α), with respect to the cost function L− θ + α, in non-decreasing order, such that
(θ, α) ∈ SE,F
△
=
{
(θ, α) : θ ∈ Z+, α ∈ N, β = L− 2θ + α ≥ 0
}
. (IV-5)
Since this sorting needs to be done over (θ, α), our next task is to characterize the feasible set SE,F over which the sorting
will be carried out.
First of all, notice that from the definition of G (θ, α) (cf. (IV-3)), we have
2θ − α ≤ L, (IV-6)
since β = L− 2θ + α ≥ 0. Next, we define
B
△
= L− θ + α, (IV-7)
as our cost function in the aforementioned Sorting Problem I. Note that, for any q ∈ G (θ, α), Pr (Q = q) = 2−(θ+β) = 2−B;
i.e., for any guess G (i, θ,q), its success probability is equal to 2−B where B is computed via (IV-7) using the corresponding
θ and α. This means that, for any given guess G (·), its marginal success probability, Pr (T (G) = 1) is directly determined
by the corresponding value of B.
Next, our goal is to find an alternate re-parameterized expression for (IV-5) in terms of B and L since B is our cost function
in Sorting Problem I. Now, using (IV-7) in (IV-6) and noting that α ∈ N yields
α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2B − L} . (IV-8)
which also implies that B ≥ L/2 since α ≥ 0. As a side result, this accordingly implies the following upper bound on the
marginal success probability of any valid guess:
Pr [T (G (i, θ,q)) = 1] = 2−B
∣∣
B=θ+β
≤ 2−L/2 for any G (i, θ,q) ∈ G (θ, α) for some α ∈ N. (IV-9)
The result (IV-9) will be useful in proving Theorem 5.2 of Section V.
Next, per (IV-7), each value of α uniquely determines θ in terms of B via
θ = L−B + α. (IV-10)
Using (IV-10) in (IV-8), we have
θ ∈ {L−B,L−B + 1, . . . , B} , (IV-11)
23
which also implies that B ≤ L−1 since θ ≥ 1. Combining these observations, we find out the following equivalent expression
to (IV-5):
(θ, α) ∈ SE,F =
L−1⋃
B=L
2
{(L−B, 0) , (L−B + 1, 1) , (L−B + 2, 2) , . . . , (B − 1, 2B − L− 1) , (B, 2B − L)} , (IV-12)
where we effectively did a re-parameterization using B. Note that, this re-parameterization allows us to see that, given a fixed
B, all {G (θ, α)} such that
(θ, α) ∈ {(L−B, 0) , (L−B + 1, 1) , (L−B + 2, 2) , . . . , (B − 1, 2B − L− 1) , (B, 2B − L)} ,
are equivalent to each other in terms of their success probabilities, 2−B. Using this observation and (IV-12), we conclude that
Sorting Problem I is equivalent to to the following one:
Sorting Problem II: Sort over (B,α) with respect to B in non-decreasing order, such that
(B,α) ∈ {(B,α) : α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2B − L}, B ∈ {L/2, . . . , L− 1}} . (IV-13)
Note that, the corresponding values of θ in (IV-13) are given by (IV-10).
Following is one of the solutions to Sorting Problem II:
{(B,α)} = {(L/2, 0) , (L/2 + 1, 0) , (L/2 + 1, 1) , (L/2 + 1, 2) , (L/2 + 2, 0) . . . , (L− 1, L− 2)} . (IV-14)
Note that all solutions to Sorting Problem II are equivalent to each other in terms of the resulting complexity. In particular,
for a given B, we follow the strategy of varying α in increasing order, beginning from 0, ending in 2B − L as illustrated in
(IV-14).
Next, we concentrate on the range of L/2 ≤ B < 2L/3 and analyze the corresponding cumulative success probability
(denoted by P1) of the aforementioned strategy (cf. (IV-14)), i.e.,
P1
△
=
2L
3
−1∑
B=L
2
2B−L∑
α=0
Pr
(
G (θ, α)|θ=L−B+α
)
. (IV-15)
Next, we derive an upper bound on P1 which will be used in the subsequent computations.
Lemma IV-1: The cumulative success probability in the range of L/2 ≤ B < 2L/3 (i.e., P1) is upper-bounded by
P1 ≤
2L
3
−1∑
θ=L
3
+1
θ−L
3
−1∑
α=0
Pr (G (θ, α)) . (IV-16)
Proof: From (IV-15), we see that P1 is defined in the (B,α) space (where B = L− θ + α), over the set
Λ
△
=
{
(B,α) :
L
2
≤ B ≤
2L
3
− 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ 2B − L
}
, (IV-17)
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i.e., P1 =
∑
(B,α)∈Λ Pr (G (θ, α))|θ=L−B+α. Next, we proceed with defining a set Λ˜. The purpose of using this set is to
transform the summation indexes to corresponding (θ, α) for each (B,α) ∈ Λ˜. Now we show that Λ˜ is a superset of Λ.This
is done in four steps.
1) First, recall that
α ≥ 0. (IV-18)
2) Second, observe that
[
B ≤
2L
3
− 1
]
=⇒
[
L− θ + α ≤
2L
3
− 1
]
=⇒
[
α ≤ θ −
L
3
− 1
]
(IV-19)
3) Third, note that (IV-19) is equivalent to
θ ≥
L
3
+ α+ 1 (IV-20)
Using (IV-18) in (IV-20) implies
θ ≥
L
3
+ 1 (IV-21)
4) Fourth, using B ≤ 2L3 − 1 in α ≤ 2B − L (cf. (IV-17)) implies
α ≤
L
3
− 2. (IV-22)
Also, using (IV-7) we have
[α ≤ 2B − L = L− 2θ + 2α] =⇒
[
θ ≤
L
2
+
α
2
]
. (IV-23)
Using (IV-22) in (IV-23) yields
θ ≤
2L
3
− 1. (IV-24)
Now, defining
Λ˜
△
=
{
(B,α) :
L
3
+ 1 ≤ θ ≤
2L
3
− 1, 0 ≤ α ≤ θ −
L
3
− 1, where B = L− θ + α
}
,
and using (IV-18), (IV-19), (IV-21), (IV-24), we conclude that Λ ⊆ Λ˜, which implies (IV-16).
Next, we proceed with providing an upper bound on the right hand side of (IV-16), which will be shown to be O (L−1),
i.e., diminishing in L, the length of the generator polynomial of the LFSR9. In order to achieve this task, we heavily use the
concept of “typical set” (cf. (III-1)). Note that, using (IV-4) and H(Q) = 2, (III-1) can be shown to be equivalent to
A(θ)ǫ =
{
qθ1 : 1− ǫ ≤
β
θ
≤ 1 + ǫ
}
. (IV-25)
9This result, in turn, implies that an optimal QuBaR attack which uses the solution to the Sorting Problem II for θ > L/3 has a negligible cumulative
success probability, i.e., negligible success probability.
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In the following lemma, we show that all guesses {G (θ, α)} included in the summation of the right hand side of (IV-16) are
necessarily “atypical” (i.e., belong to the complement of the corresponding typical set).
Lemma IV-2: For any θ ∈ Z+, such that θ > L/3, and for all α ∈ N, such that 0 ≤ α ≤ θ− L3 , we have G (θ, α) ⊆ [A
(θ)
ǫ ](c)
for all ǫ ∈
(
0, 2θ
)
, where [A(θ)ǫ ](c) denotes the complement of the typical set A(θ)ǫ .
Proof: First of all, note that (cf. (IV-3)), we have
[
qθ1 ∈ G(θ, α)
]
⇒
[
β
θ
=
(
L
θ
− 2
)
+
α
θ
]
. (IV-26)
Hence, for any qθ1 ∈ G(θ, α) such that θ > L/3 and 0 ≤ α ≤ θ − L3 , we have
−
1
θ
log p
(
qθ1
)
−H(Q) =
θ + β
θ
− 2, (IV-27)
=
L− θ + α
θ
− 2 =
L+ α
θ
− 3, (IV-28)
≤
2L
3θ
− 2, (IV-29)
≤
2L
L+ 3
− 2 = −
6
L+ 3
< 0, (IV-30)
where (IV-27) follows from the fact that p (qθ1) = 2−(θ+β) and H (Q) = 2, (IV-28) follows using (IV-26) in (IV-27), (IV-29)
follows since α ≤ θ − L/3, (IV-30) follows since θ ≥ L3 + 1. Note that (IV-30) implies∣∣∣∣−1θ log p (qθ1)−H(Q)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 6L+ 3 . (IV-31)
Now, since θ ≥ L3 + 1 (equivalently 2θ ≤ 6L+3 ), we have ǫ < 6L+3 for all ǫ ∈
(
0, 2θ
)
. Using this in (IV-31), the claim follows.
Next, we provide an upper bound on the right hand side of (IV-16) using Lemma IV-2. For all ǫθ ∈
(
0, 2θ
)
, we have
2L
3
−1∑
θ=L
3
+1
θ−L
3
−1∑
α=0
Pr (G (θ, α)) ≤
2L
3
−1∑
θ=L
3
+1
Pr
([
Aθǫθ
](c))
, (IV-32)
≤
2L
3
−1∑
θ=L
3
+1
ǫθ, (IV-33)
≤
(
L
3
− 1
)(
max
L
3
+1≤θ≤ 2L
3
−1
ǫθ
)
, (IV-34)
where (IV-32) follows from Lemma IV-2 and the fact that, for any given θ, {G (θ, α)} are disjoint by construction, (IV-33)
follows from (III-3). Now, choosing ǫθ = 1θ2 for all θ, and using (IV-34) in (IV-16), we have
P1 ≤
(
L
3
− 1
)(
max
L
3
+1≤θ≤ 2L
3
−1
1
θ2
)
=
L/3− 1
(L/3 + 1)
2 <
3
L
. (IV-35)
Thus, for any δ1 > 0, there exists a sufficiently large L (per assumption A4), where
P1 < δ1. (IV-36)
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Note that, for the optimal strategy, which uses the ordering mentioned in (IV-14), (IV-35) and (IV-36) imply that the range
of L2 ≤ B ≤
2L
3 − 1 is not sufficient to achieve every given cumulative success probability strictly greater than 1/2, since δ1
can be made arbitrarily small. Therefore, we necessarily need to include guesses with B = 2L/3 in the optimal structure to
achieve a cumulative success probability strictly greater than 1/2.
Next, we proceed with quantifying the contribution to the cumulative success probability for the case of B = 2L/3. In this
case, for the optimal strategy, since θ = L − B + α and 0 ≤ α ≤ 2B − L for a given value of B, the corresponding (θ, α)
pairs are of the form
{(
L
3 + α, α
)}
0≤α≤L/3
. Thus, for the case of B = 2L/3, the total contribution to the cumulative success
probability is given by
Pr (G(L/3, 0)) +
L/3∑
α=1
Pr (G(L/3 + α, α)) . (IV-37)
Note that, the right hand side of (IV-37) is “atypical” per Lemma IV-2; accordingly, we will show that the only significant
contribution to the cumulative success probability is due to the left hand side of (IV-37) since it includes terms within the
corresponding typical set.
Next, we provide an upper bound on the right hand side of (IV-37). Defining P2 △=
∑L/3
α=1 Pr (G(L/3 + α, α)), for all
ǫθ ∈
(
0, 2θ
)
, we have
P2 =
2L/3∑
θ=L
3
+1
Pr (G(θ, θ − L/3)) , (IV-38)
≤
2L/3∑
θ=L
3
+1
Pr
([
Aθǫθ
]c)
, (IV-39)
≤
(
L
3
)(
max
L/3+1≤θ≤2L/3
ǫθ
)
, (IV-40)
where (IV-38) follows from using θ = (L−B + α)|B=2L/3, (IV-39) follows from Lemma IV-2, (IV-40) follows using (III-3).
Choosing ǫθ = 1θ2 for all θ in (IV-40), we have
P2 ≤
L/3
(L/3 + 1)
2 <
3
L
. (IV-41)
Thus, for any δ2 > 0, there exists a sufficiently large L (per assumption A4), where
P2 < δ2. (IV-42)
Since δ1 (resp. δ2) in (IV-36) (resp. (IV-42)) can be made arbitrarily small, we necessarily need to use guesses from the set
G
(
L
3 , 0
)
in order to achieve a cumulative success probability strictly greater than 1/2.
Next, consider the case of (θ, α) =
(
L
3 , 0
)
: Note that, for any qL/31 ∈ G
(
L
3 , 0
)
, we have
p
(
q
L/3
1
)
= 2−(2L/3). (IV-43)
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Per (IV-25), (IV-43) implies that G (L3 , 0) ⊆ A(L/3)ǫ for any ǫ > 0. Furthermore, after some straightforward algebraic
manipulations, it can be shown that, for 0 < ǫ < 3L , we have A
(L/3)
ǫ ⊆ G
(
L
3 , 0
)
; therefore we have
G
(
L
3
, 0
)
= A(L/3)ǫ for 0 < ǫ <
3
L
. (IV-44)
In fact, (IV-44) constitutes the fundamental crux of the converse proof. This observation implies that, using sufficiently many
guesses from the set G
(
L
3 , 0
)
is both necessary (since δ1 and δ2 may be arbitrarily small) and sufficient (since for 0 < ǫ < 3L ,
we have Pr
(
G
(
L
3 , 0
))
= Pr
(
A
(L/3)
ǫ
)
> 1− ǫ) to achieve a cumulative success probability strictly greater than 1/2 for large
L (per Assumption A4).
Now, let
P1 + P2 + P3 > 1/2, (IV-45)
denote the cumulative success probability of optimal attack in the set S˜Ep , where P3 denotes the contribution to the cumulative
success probability by the guesses from G
(
L
3 , 0
)10
. Using (IV-35) and (IV-41) in (IV-45), we have
P3 >
1
2
−
6
L
. (IV-46)
Next, let C′ denote the number of sequences used from the set G
(
L
3 , 0
)
. Using (IV-43), we have
C′ = P3/2
−2L/3. (IV-47)
Combining (IV-46) and (IV-47) yields
[
C′ > 22L/3
(
1
2
−
6
L
)]
=⇒
[
C
(
A˜
E
opt
)
> 22L/3
(
1
2
−
6
L
)]
,
since C
(
A˜
E
opt
)
> C′. Next, using SEp ⊆ S˜Ep yields
CEmin = C
(
A
E
opt
)
≥ C˜Emin = C
(
A˜
E
opt
)
> 22L/3
(
1
2
−
6
L
)
, (IV-48)
where AEopt and A˜Eopt have been defined in (IV-1) and (IV-8), respectively. Hence, the claim finally follows.
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
For the sake of clarity, we use the notation Gk
(
ik = 1, θk,
(
qθk+ik−1ik
)
k
)
(instead of Gk
(
ik = 1, θk,q
θk+ik−1
ik
)
) throughout
the proof in this section.
(i) First of all, note that letting AEopt = {Gk}
C(AEopt)
k=1 denote the optimal exhaustive-search type QuBaR attack against
ABSG with success probability Prsucc
(
A
E
opt
)
, the claim is equivalent to the following statement: For any i 6= j; i, j ∈
10Note that, w.l.o.g. we assume that, at step B = 2L/3, the proposed optimal attack uses guesses from the set G
“
L
3
, 0
”
in the end (i.e., after applying
guesses from the sets
n
G
“
L
3
+ α, α
”oL/3
α=1
of which contributions to the cumulative success probability is denoted by P2). Since our strategy is to “lower-
bound” the number of guesses from the set G
“
L
3
, 0
”
and declare the resulting value as a lower bound on the overall complexity, C˜min , this approach
maintains the validity of our result.
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{1, . . . , C
(
AEopt
)
} (assuming θj > θi w.l.o.g.), we have
(
qθi1
)
i
6=
(
qθi1
)
j
. Suppose to the contrary, we have
(
qθi1
)
i
=(
qθi1
)
j
for some i 6= j; i, j ∈ {1, . . . , C
(
AEopt
)
} where w.l.o.g. θj > θi. Given AEopt, we construct an exhaustive-search
type QuBaR attack A˜E via eliminating Gj from AEopt, i.e., A˜E
△
= {G˜k}
C(AEopt)−1
k=1 where G˜k = Gk for k ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}
and G˜k = Gk+1 for k ∈ {j, . . . , C
(
AEopt
)
− 1}. Next, note that
[(T (Gj) = 1) ⇒ (T (Gi) = 1)] =⇒
[
Pr
(
∨
C(AEopt)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
= Pr
(
∨1≤k≤C(AEopt), k 6=j
[T (Gk) = 1]
)]
.
(V-1)
If Gj is a correct guess, then all
(
q
θj
1
)
j
are correct, which implies
(
qθi1
)
j
are necessarily correct as well since θi < θj .
Further, this implies that
(
qθi1
)
i
are correct as well per the contradiction assumption. Hence, this proves the left hand
side of (V-1); thus, the right hand side of (V-1) is true as well. This, in turn, is equivalent to Prsucc
(
AEopt
)
= Prsucc(A˜
E)
which yields the promised contradiction (C
(
A˜E
)
= C
(
AEopt
)
−1) since AEopt is an optimal exhaustive-search type QuBaR
attack for the given success probability Prsucc
(
AEopt
)
; hence the proof the first statement of Theorem 4.3.
(ii) Suppose not; then this means that there exists some i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C (AEopt)} , i 6= j, such that Pr [(T (Gi) = 1)∩
(T (Gj) = 1)] > 0. This implies that there is some realization q˜ of Q with non-zero probability such that the events of
(T (Gi) = 1) and (T (Gj) = 1) both occur at the same time. In other words, there exists some q˜ with Pr (Q = q˜) > 0 such
that
(
qθi1
)
i
= q˜θi1 and
(
q
θj
1
)
j
= q˜
θj
1 . However, this implies that
(
qθi1
)
i
is a prefix of
(
q
θj
1
)
j
(assuming w.l.o.g. θi < θj).
Hence contradiction (per the first statement of Theorem 4.3) and the proof of the second statement of Theorem 4.3.
(iii) This statement is the direct consequence of the first and second statements of the theorem.
(iv) First recall that, at optimality C (AEopt) is the smallest possible value (given the success probability Prsucc (AEopt)). This
observation and (6) clearly imply that the optimal strategy consists of “sorted” guesses (in descending order) with respect
to the probabilities {Pr (T (Gk) = 1)} of the corresponding success events {(T (Gk) = 1)} since the success probability
Prsucc
(
AEopt
)
is fixed.
APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
The attack mentioned in the statement of the theorem is the “most probable case attack” given in [7], [15], which consists
of simply “trying” a guess of the all zero sequence of {Qi} (of length L/2) for non-overlapping windows of output; here we
assume w.l.o.g. that L is sufficiently large and even per assumption A4 of Sec. III-A. Formally, this attack can be defined as
follows:
Aach,opt = {Gk}
C(Aach,opt)
k=1 , s.t. for each guess Gk =
(
ik, θk,q
ik+θk−1
ik
)
, ik = (k − 1)
L
2
+ 1, θk =
L
2
, βk = 0,
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where we recall that, for each k, βk =
∑θk−1
j=0 qik+j and the probability of Gk’s being correct is Pr [T (Gk) = 1] = 2−(θk+βk).
Since βk = 0 and θk = L2 for each guess Gk of the proposed attack, we have,
Pr [T (Gk) = 1] = 2
−L/2, 1 ≤ k ≤ C (Aach,opt) . (VI-1)
Hence, we have
Prsucc(Aach,opt) = Pr
(
∨
C(Aach,opt)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
,
= 1− Pr
(
∧
C(Aach,opt)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 0]
)
,
= 1−
C(Aach,opt)∏
k=1
Pr [T (Gk) = 0] , (VI-2)
= 1−
(
1− 2−L/2
)C(Aach,opt)
, (VI-3)
where (VI-2) follows from the fact that the events of {T (Gk) = 0} are independent (since they correspond to sequences of
non-overlapping windows of {Qi}, which are i.i.d.) and (VI-3) follows from (VI-1). Now, recall that
lim
x→0
(1− x)1/x = 1/e (VI-4)
Next, choosing C (Aach,opt) = 2L/2, for large L we have
lim
L→∞
Prsucc(Aach,opt) = lim
L→∞
[
1−
(
1− 2−L/2
)(2L/2)]
= 1−
1
e
>
1
2
,
which follows from (VI-4). This implies that Aach,opt ∈ Sp, where C (Aach,opt) = 2L/2 for sufficiently large L (per assumption
A4). Furthermore, note that all guesses {Gk} of the proposed attack Aach,opt are equally-likely to succeed (cf. (VI-1)), which
subsequently implies that Cave (Aach,opt) = 12
(
2L/2 + 1
)
. Hence the proof.
APPENDIX VII
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2
Throughout the proof, we assume w.l.o.g. L is even, since it is sufficiently large per assumption A4. We first recall that we
have
∀ k ∈ Z+, Pr (T (Gk) = 1) ≤
(
1
2
)L/2
, (VII-1)
due to (IV-9) of Appendix IV 11.
Next, we proceed with a similar approach to the one pursued in the proof of Theorem 4.2. In particular, we begin with
defining a set S˜p, which is a superset of Sp, the set of successful QuBaR attacks (cf. (7)):
S˜p
△
=

A = {Gk}C(A)k=1 :
C(A)∑
k=1
Pr[T (Gk) = 1] > 1/2

 . (VII-2)
11Note that, in Appendix IV, we derived (IV-9) for exhaustive-search attacks, for which the starting index of the attack is set to unity (cf. (IV-3)). However,
after some straightforward algebra, it can be shown that, following (IV-3), all the subsequent derivations of Appendix IV, regarding the “valid ranges of
fundamental system parameters”, θ, β, α and B, (including the utilized result (IV-9)) are still valid even if we relax the aforementioned condition on the
starting index, which amounts to the general case attacks. Thus, (IV-9) can be shown to hold in the case of general QuBaR attacks.
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Using the union bound yields
Pr
(
∨
C(A)
k=1 [T (Gk) = 1]
)
≤
C(A)∑
k=1
Pr (T (Gk) = 1) .
Thus, we have
[A ∈ Sp] =⇒
[
A ∈ S˜p
]
,
which implies
Sp ⊆ S˜p. (VII-3)
Further, for any A ∈ S˜p, we have
1
2
<
C(A)∑
k=1
Pr [T (Gk) = 1] ≤
C(A)∑
k=1
(1/2)L/2 = 2−L/2C (A) , (VII-4)
where the first and the second inequalities follow from (VII-2) and (VII-1), respectively. As a result, we have
min
A∈Sp
C (A) ≥ min
A∈S˜p
C (A) > 2L/2−1,
where the first inequality follows from (VII-3) and the second inequality follows from the fact that (VII-4) holds for any
A ∈ S˜p. Hence the proof.
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